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The State and Subaltern Assertion in the Diaspora:  
Towards a Pan-South Asian Identity?	  
 
Crispin Bates  
 
In Subaltern Citizens and their Histories, the Indian historian Gyan Pandey has encouraged 
scholars to re-consider the subaltern in terms of their developing relationship with the formal 
politics of the state. This has been anathema to many scholars, who prefer to use subalternity 
purely as a relational cultural concept. In doing so, he has sought to highlight, in a thought-
provoking manner, the ways in which subaltern groups have endeavoured to cast their 
identities in defiance of the categories and discourse of caste and religious community that 
have dominated Indian Studies, and of race which has dominated the discourse of ethnic 
difference and social exclusion in the USA. Historically, however, the essentialising 
categories of race, caste, and religious community have dominated the design of constitutions 
and the decision-making processes of many governments for most of the twentieth century, 
with powerful influences that are still felt in the present day. The reification of such identities 
has provided them with an ontological status that can readily be manipulated, thereby 
multiplying their significance and import in reality. They have thus been the preferred tool of 
politicians and administrators: cynically in the pursuit of power as well as by those inspired 
by benign but ill-informed and fundamentally un-democratic attempts at social and political 
management. 
 
In India, the now widely-used term ‘communalism’ was invented by colonial rulers in the 
nineteenth century, to refer to the use and manipulation of religious differences for ‘political’ 
ends antithetical to the national interest. It is related to, but very different from, the idea of 
‘community’. Arguably, the rise of ‘communalism’ was partly a reaction to the undermining 
of older, more local communities by rapid economic and social change. During the period of 
colonial occupation alternative outlets for popular unease and discontent included the Indian 
nationalist movement, but the division of this movement into Muslim, Hindu, Brahmin, non-
Brahmin and other fractions, encouraged by the colonial power for strategic reasons, became 
a hall-mark of Indian politics and social life in the late colonial period.  
 
The secularist consensus established in the early years after Independence for a while 
promised a new future for India. However, during recent decades, the decline of secularism, 
the ending of Congress Party hegemony, and the emergence of fundamentalist parties and 
organisations has made communalism once more a prominent feature of Indian life (Ludden 
1990; Basu and Subramanyam 1996). Communalism has also spread beyond the subcontinent, 
the political conflicts within India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka increasingly being found mirrored 
amongst the substantial communities of Indians and Pakistanis living abroad.  
 
For historians the question of how the twentieth century’s conception of community and 
contemporary ideas of communalism came about is one of considerable controversy. 
However, among contemporary sociologists studying community or ‘race relations’ (as they 
used to be termed) in the United States, the Caribbean, Africa, the U.K. or Indian Ocean 
States it is often assumed that the identities of migrant communities are largely brought with 
them, and that they are based upon primordial forms of identity and conflict to be found in the 
Indian subcontinent. The international activities of militant political and religious 
organisations such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or Jamaat-e-Islami are likewise 
predicated upon this assumption, that the interests and identities of Hindus and Muslims are 
essentially the same.i When looked at more closely however, and in comparative perspective, 
it soon becomes apparent that to ‘be a Hindu’ in Leicester, in England, for example, is very 
different from ‘being a Hindu’ in Durban, South Africa, and that even within the 
subcontinent, the identities of, for example, Muslims in Bombay, and those in Hyderabad, 
Lucknow or Bangladesh are very different from one another. 
 
The above essentialist and fundamentalist assumptions are, however, being questioned in 
recent scholarship which seeks to explain the divergent historical circumstances that have led 
to the various outcomes in terms of community relations amongst migrant groups in Asia. 
They have also sought to examine the origins and consequences of the widely varying 
identities that have emerged among migrant communities within South Asia, and amongst the 
many communities of South Asians scattered beyond the subcontinent in the former territories 
of Britain’s colonial empire. In the process, they have been forced to admit the role played by 
subaltern agency ‘from below’ in re-shaping identities, notwithstanding the legacies of the 
past and the highly influential structures of governance set in place by colonial and post-
colonial governments and states. 
 
 
Community and Empire 
Most contemporary scholars are keen to emphasize that ethnic identities are far from being 
primordial (e.g. Brass 1991; Engineer 1985). According to Paul Brass, competing elites draw 
upon, employ and even fabricate myths, symbols and other elements from indigenous 
societies in order to fashion a rhetoric that will mobilise populations in pursuit of collective 
and individual advantages. The modern centralized state plays a crucial role in this process, 
creating an arena in which ethnic nationalism can flourish. Etienne Balibar, for instance has 
even argued that nationalism and racism, as well as communalism, are indissolubly linked, 
being part of the process by which modern capitalist economies manage and control their 
populations, in particular, the size and remuneration of the workforce (Balibar 1991). In the 
colonial context, the inadequacy of democratic structures renders elite leadership all the more 
important, and efforts by the colonial power to avert the emergence of a united front amongst 
indigenous elites (the strategy of ‘divide and rule’), gave further encouragement to the 
emergence of a multiplicity of ethnic nationalisms (Tinker 1976). In Africa, the institutions of 
indirect rule were built upon an assumption by the colonial power that African society was 
already divided into ethnic fractions, a theory which then frequently assumed the power of 
self-fulfilment. By empowering specified loyal elites, colonial regimes created a practical 
locus for political activity, even in communities where no such point of focus of power and 
loyalty had previously existed (Vail 1988; Lema 1993).  
 
India was the inspiration for many of the methods of colonial governance deployed in Africa, 
and similar effects may be observed on both continents. In India, caste, tribe and aristocracy 
were the main bulwarks of customary rule, with zamindars (the revenue intermediaries of 
large estates in Mughal times) and other feudal elites being invested with unusual territorial 
powers by the British government. A separation of public and private law was enforced, and 
caste and tribe were used as instruments of imperial management and control through 
enactments such as the criminal tribes legislation of the 1870s (Robb 1996; Nigam 1990; 
Cohn 1983). However, social divisions existed not only through their wilful promotion by the 
colonial regime. Class played an important role too in generating rivalry and conflict. Thus 
not only nationalism, but rapid economic change in the late nineteenth century played a part 
in the emergence of rival caste associations, and revivalist and reform movements amongst 
both Hindus and Muslims in India (Pandey 1990). In 1909, 1918 and 1935 the British began 
to exploit these movements, and the conflicts that sometimes resulted, by institutionalising so-
called communal differences in successive extensions of the franchise. Separate electorates 
were created for Hindus, Muslims, Untouchables and Adivasis, thus making it very difficult 
for nationalist politicians to unify these sections of society in the struggle against 
colonialismii. 
At independence, countries as diverse as India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Cyprus and Fiji, 
were left with Constitutions that enshrined this idea of separate electorate, and these 
Constitutions remained in force for a considerable time with little modification. In some 
cases, such as Mauritius, they have survived almost unchanged to this day. As with the 
policies of indirect rule in Africa, Constitutions enshrining the idea of a ‘plural society’ 
frequently created the very social atomism and rivalry that they sought to contain. And when 
competition and rivalry erupt into violence this creates a further sense of distance and the 
process of division is complete (Tambiah 1996). The outcome of colonial policies of divide 
and rule, however, were never as predictable as the above narrative suggests, and by 
explaining the fate of migrant Indian communities overseas it is hoped that it may become 
more easily possible to perceive the effect of subaltern attempts to re-form received identities 
and to conceive of alternative possibilities of existence.  
 
 
Community and Migration 
Migration is sometimes put forward as being amongst the fundamental causes of 
communalism, leading to the 'mixing' of naturally exclusive communities (e.g. Weiner, 1988). 
It might alternatively be argued that if migration is indeed a determining factor this might 
simply be because dislocation promotes insecurity. Although they are often more prosperous 
than those they leave behind, communities of Indians abroad are beleaguered in a variety of 
ways – numerically in a minority and culturally marginalised in the societies in which they 
live, as well as forced more often on a daily basis to face the extremes of ‘white’ racism. 
Within the Indian Ocean region however, communities of migrant Indians are to be found 
numerically and culturally in a majority, or at least in significant numbers, as in Mauritius and 
Sri Lanka. Both societies are prosperous. Why then communal conflict should erupt in one 
and not in the other remains a paradox. Even closer to the Hindu heartland of north India, in 
cities like Kolkata and Bhopal, migrant communities are sometimes able to integrate 
seamlessly into the societies in which they are placed. At other times they suffer apparently 
irreconcilable differences with neighbours from whom they are religiously, culturally or 
ethnically distanced. Whilst the study of inter-ethnic civic institutions has offered one way 
towards partially resolving this conundrum (Varshney 2002), the study of migrancy itself as a 
factor has yet received little attention. 
 
 
Migrant Cultures and ‘Postcolonial’ Identities 
A consistent conclusion, noticed in much recent research concerns the apparent adaptability of 
migrant communities, and the ease with which their identities have often integrated or 
otherwise transformed to meet the pressures of different circumstances—a possibly optimistic 
outcome in an era where identities, particularly religious identities, are increasingly regarded 
as intransigent and irreconcilable with one another. The research of John Kelly in Fiji (Kelly 
1991, 1992, 2001) brings this theme very much to the fore, charting the history of Fijian 
migrant identity from ‘coolie’ to ‘Indian’, and the resistance of the Indian population to the 
communal space carved out for them by the British.  
Fiji’s migrant Indians accounted for forty-six per cent of the population by 1946. Most had 
arrived under indenture contracts to meet the needs of the island’s burgeoning sugar industry. 
The Fijian indentured labourers were described as ‘coolies’ by the British, but referred to 
themselves as girmitiyasiii. From the very beginning ethnic Fijian and Indian populations were 
spatially separated, a practice commonly followed in British colonies, ostensibly to manage, 
but in practice more often affirming colonial preconceptions of racial difference. After 1936 
Fijian and Indian ‘communities’ were also differentially represented in political terms. The 
administration included members from the ‘Indian’ community within a limited programme 
of self-government in an effort to encourage continuing Indian immigration following the 
abolition of indenture in 1910. (This had been against the wishes of the short-lived Fiji Indian 
National Congress, which wanted a ‘common roll’, regardless of raceiv).  
 
The situation contrasted markedly with that in India, where defiance of the colonial 
government and conflict with its communal allies was the hall-mark of Indian nationalism in 
the 1940s. Kelly explains this by arguing that the indentured migrants did not generally think 
of themselves as ‘Indians’ before they arrived in Fiji. Oral evidence suggests that caste and 
even religious identification was extremely uneven from one sugar estate to the next, and that 
Indian identities were numerous and overlapping, unlike the stereotyped roles cast for them 
by British and Fijian politicians. Ultimately, the separation of communities was reinforced in 
debates in the National Assembly, and the ethnic Fijian chiefs overhauled the ‘Native 
Regulations’ in 1944, in order to tie the indigenous or ethnic Fijians more tightly than ever to 
their natal villages. However, these separations, ethnic, spatial and constitutional, were 
maintained against the persistent wishes of Indian representatives.  
 
 
Constitutional Innovation and the Sublimation of Conflict: The Case of Mauritius 
 
The example of Mauritius presents a very different picture from that of Fiji: an island 
apparently without conflict, and where the effects of colonial policies of divide and rule, have 
been undermined by a series of carefully constructed political and social compromises. While 
the island is clearly divided on ethnic and religious grounds, ‘Hindu’ Mauritians follow a 
number of original customs and practices, quite different from those seen in the Indian 
subcontinent, with whom other links and commonalities are considered so importantv. Some 
‘castes’ in Mauritius in particular are quite unrecognisable from a sub-continental perspective, 
and may incorporate mutually antagonistic castes from an Indian setting into a single group. 
Thus, a ‘Rajput’ in Mauritius is of a sudra caste, the title having been usurped by this group in 
the nineteenth century. The terms Hindu and 'Indien' refer exclusively to north Indian Hindus. 
Migrants from Tamilnad identify their religious group as Tamil, not Hindu, and minority 
groups such as ‘Telegus’ and ‘Marathis’ are preoccupied with maintaining regional endogamy 
rather than with caste distinctions. The former Brahmin elite are referred to as the Maraz and 
together with the former Rajputs and other kshatriyas, now called ‘Babujis’, enjoy the 
prestige conferred by high caste status, whilst politically they complain of marginalisation. 
The vaisha are the largest and most influential caste group on the island. Internally the group 
is divided into Koeri, Kurmi, Kahar, Ahir, Lohar and other jati-s. In the past many admitted to 
Chamar status (as shown by historical records), but recently this seems to have become 
completely taboo. This group, now commonly known as ‘Rajputs’, will also sometimes 
describe themselves as ‘Raviveds’. Mauritian Muslims may not admit to originating from 
India at all, connecting instead with a broader Islamic identification, whilst Christian Tamils 
who came as slaves or skilled free labourers in the eighteenth century today are a class apart 
from the descendants of nineteenth century Tamils. Only one community freely admits to 
mixed origins and welcomes intermarriage, the Creoles, and even here shared religion is a 
determining factor in most partnerships.  
 
Because of their numerical preponderance, the Prime Minister has so far always been chosen 
from among the vaisha community. All ‘communities’ are represented in the cabinet, and 
lobbies continually ensure that ethnic interests are secured through ‘their’ Minister. Whatever 
their formal constituency, every major political party makes a point of inducting members of 
all communities, but the parties have to be led by vaisha if they are to stand any chance of 
electoral success. By one means or another, therefore, the majority community asserts its 
influence and control, even if formally the constitution attempts to effect a balance between 
their interests and those of other groups. 
We know from Scott (1985) that social and political conflict need not present itself in 
organised, violent or insurrectionary forms, yet may still be significant. What seems to have 
happened in Mauritius since 1968 is that since a formal accord has been arrived at through the 
constitution to keep communal conflict at bay in the political sphere, it has simply been driven 
underground and into the small scale rivalries of day-to-day life.vi Your preferred drink, the 
car you drive, even your superstitions are all ethnically determined in modern Mauritius. 
Competition between soft drink manufacturers is common the world over, but in Mauritius 
the Pepsi franchise is owned by the Muslim Gujarati Currimjee family, and as a result many 
Muslim retail outlets sell only Pepsi and at Muslim functions Pepsi is served. Biryanis (a 
traditional Muslim dish), it is said, ‘goes best with Pepsi’, which thus has a unique place in 
the commensal rites of this community. The Coca-Cola franchise, by contrast, is owned by a 
Hindu family, is distributed in all Hindu retail outlets and is the preferred carbonated soft 
drink of this community. In their daily lives therefore Hindus and Muslims on the island know 
by their constitution that they belong to different fractions of society, and whilst prevented 
from doing so in Parliament, they act out a communal conflict in trivial aspects of their 
everyday existence.  
 
Whilst seemingly trivial, such incidents confirm the profound and quotidian nature of 
communal differences on the island of Mauritius. An uneasy truce on the communal front has 
emerged and coalition government has prevailed, but this has only been with the backing of 
repressive Industrial Relations Legislation (limiting the power of the MMM), the 1970 Public 
Order Act and subsequent enactments, which prohibit the publication of seditious, communal 
and libellous articles (broadly defined) in magazines and newspapers. There is also 
considerable political influence over the activities of courts of law – inhibiting the prosecution 
of cases that might provoke communal tension. However, the current peace in Mauritius is 
arguably a mere simulacrum of the harmony spoken of in the tourist brochures, and it prevails 
most probably despite rather than because of (as some would maintain) its colonial 
constitutional and electoral system.  
 
 
Migrant Origins and the Perception of Identity: Sri Lanka  
The population of Sri Lanka, like that of any other country, was highly diverse. The origins of 
the island’s inhabitants did not become an important issue, according to Nira Wickramasinghe 
(1995 and 2001), until British scholars began to speculate about it in the late nineteenth 
century and to devise hierarchical classifications of various groups according to the historical 
period in which they are supposed to have come. The Aryan theory of Indo-European origins 
was a particularly important challenge. In pre-colonial Sri Lanka the notion of Arya existed, 
but Aryan was a status obtainable through the performance of meritorious acts. British 
physical anthropologists by contrast believed it to be a racial category, enabling the 
differentiation of the South Asian population into discrete racial groups. A key moment in Sri 
Lanka was the translation of the Mahavamsa epic into Sinhalese in the early twentieth century 
by Wilhelm Geiger.vii This assisted Sinhalese intellectuals who linked together colonial racial 
classifications with the tale of Vijaya’s landing on the island in the 6th century B.C., thus 
providing the myth of a common, superior, Aryan origin for the Sinhalese people. This was 
far more appealing than depicting them as the descendants of the hordes of the demon-king 
Ravana (as depicted in the Ramayana), or any of the many other popular mythic theories of 
origin that abounded at the time.  
 
The Vijayan myth captured people’s imagination and became the kernel of Sinhalese 
nationalism. At the same time the identity of migrants was defined as everything ‘un-Vijayan’ 
by Buddhist revivalists and Sinhalese nationalists who were attempting to build community 
consciousness in the early decades of the twentieth century. Under the strains of the great 
depression, this negative way of defining Sinhalese nationalism bore fateful fruit in violent 
encounters between unemployed Sinhalese and groups of migrant workers. Altogether these 
developments added considerable significance to attempts by the British to devise a 
constitution for Sri Lanka (or ‘Ceylon’ as it was then known), based upon their simplistic 
system of racial classification.  
 
The very first scheme of democratic reform in Sri Lanka was announced in 1909. 
Demands for the abandonment of communal representation were rejected, and official 
representatives were in the majority, but just like in Mauritius there were elected 
representatives introduced for each of the ‘communities’, defined by the British as consisting 
of the Europeans, the ‘Burghers’, and ‘Educated’ Ceylonese (including Sinhalese, Tamils and 
Muslims). The Donoughmore Commission promised the next major reform in 1928.viii Sri 
Lanka was a relatively prosperous, well educated and egalitarian society, however, and this 
presented a problem. According to British thinking, the franchise was not a right but a 
privilege, the granting of which must earn the loyalty of colonial subjects if it was to serve 
any purpose. Donoughmore therefore proposed a universal adult suffrage, but restricted it to 
those who could meet a test of residence for more than five years, and who affirmed a 
willingness to remain and permanently settle on the island. The issue of the various migratory 
origins of Sri Lanka’s population thus suddenly became a crucial part of the definition of civic 
rights. Wickramasinghe (1995) argues that a sharp boundary was thereby created between the 
Sinhalese and more recent migratory inhabitants of the island – particularly the Tamil workers 
on the colonial tea plantations in the highlands. As if this were not enough, middle class 
Sinhalese nationalists demanded further restrictions including the retention of a specific 
literacy test (thereby excluding most Indian workers, as well as many Ceylonese). These were 
accepted, as well as a clause allowing the vote to anyone who met a property qualification, 
thus enfranchising every European and the richest Indians. The Donoughmore Constitution 
was thus a divisive affair, extending the suffrage on a simplistic basis of class and ethnicity. 
Unsurprisingly, anti-immigrant violence was a feature in the run up to the 1936 Council 
Elections and class and ethnicity - more than religion, the key feature in Indian constitutional 
arrangements in the 1930s - have remained the significant points of fracture in Sri Lankan 
public life ever since.  
 
A perhaps significant legacy of British constitutional experiments was that anti-immigration 
legislation came to be regarded by many as the sensible and legitimate way to deal with 
strains on the economy. And thus Sri Lanka introduced stringent restrictions on immigration 
long before such measures were even thought of elsewhere. This process of exclusion became 
yet more virulent in the decades following independence, spawning the Tamil-Sinhalese civil 
war that has divided the island to this day. 
 
 
The Evolution of Territorial Ethnicity: The Mohajirs in Pakistan 
For a more pessimistic case one can look to the situation of the Hyderabadis and other 
‘Mohajir’ migrants to Pakistan, post 1947. Here, the ethnography of Karen Leonard (2001), 
Oskar Verkaaik (2004), and Nichola Khan (2010)  amongst others, reveals a persistent pattern 
of prejudice against Hyderabadi migrants, so pervasive as to encourage many to attempt to 
deny altogether their migrant origins (as with many second and third generation migrants in 
the U.K.). Some Mohajirs interviewed by Karen Leonard in her research spoke with great 
pride of their migrant identity, pointing out their elective choice to live in Pakistan, rather than 
the fact that they were merely born there. Others however, and especially the migrants from 
Hyderabad, were uncomfortable with the label, preferring to preserve their identity as 
Hyderabadis, or to integrate themselves as Pakistanis – an attempt which is not always 
welcomed. Integration has been made more difficult by the Pakistani government’s practice of 
enumerating them in the census as a separate ethnic group, a practice which has encouraged 
Mohajirs to regard themselves in this light (echoes here of the practice of the colonial regime 
in India).  
 
Hyderabadis were often highly educated and as migrants, like other Mohajirs, tended to be 
economically successful. This has fuelled a great deal of prejudice against them, and against 
which they have reacted. Despite this, the Hyderabadis have remained relatively apolitical and 
have kept their distance from the Mohajir/Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), preferring, 
apparently, anonymity rather than association with an organisation increasingly notorious for 
its militancy and violence.ix More seriously, they reason that representing Mohajirs as an 
ethnic group demanding a territorial base cannot but end in disappointment and defeat. 
Instead, many are opting out and attempting to escape the Mohajir identity. This they can 
achieve through marriage, or by adopting a regional or metropolitan culture already extant.  
 
Politically, the attempts by Mohajirs to make a place for themselves within the new state 
of Pakistan all started to come apart after 1970 when the rise of regionalism split the western 
and eastern halves of Pakistan apart. In the words of Mohammad Waseem, ‘territorial 
nationalism pushed aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of thinking’ (2001) 
and in West Pakistan, the Indus valley and Punjabi origins of Pakistani civilization were 
increasingly emphasised, at the expense of Indo-Muslim civilization, thereby marginalising 
the Mohajirs. Simultaneously, the accession to power of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 
Western Pakistan, committed to the goal of preserving Sindhi culture against the perceived 
onslaught of Mohajirs, in the words of Mohammad Waseem, ‘spelt doom for the cherished 
world view of the migrant elite rooted in a unitarian model of politics’.x  
In response to the popular four cultures identification of Pakistan – Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluch 
and Pakhtun – Mohajirs then felt entitled to create their own sub-nationalism, centred in 
Karachi and Sindh. Interestingly although they inevitably became rivals, this rivalry did not 
preclude the possibility of co-operation between the MQM and PPP against the even greater 
threat from upcountry Baluch and Pakhtun migrants in Karachi, against whom they formed an 
electoral alliance in 1988. This alliance was however a short-lived phenomenon and 
relationships between the MQM and PPP in Sindh have been marked ever since by violence, 
terrorism and periodical interventions by the military in an attempt to restore order. An 
evident fact, however, is that at any point Mohajir-Sindhi rivalry might well have been 
averted. The whole issue arose not as a result of the activities of the state, but due to its 
inactivities, and its failure on several counts to secure the legal rights of individuals and 
property. Ethnicity therefore only emerged as an alternative basis on which to defend these 
interests once the Pakistani state had proven itself insufficient to the task. 
 
 
Migrants and their ‘Others’ in the U.S.A.  
Our final example, based upon the research of Aminah Mohammed (2000, 2001], describes a 
situation far removed from the classical circumstance of Hindu-Muslim rivalry within the 
Indian sub-continent. Or so it might seem at first glance. After all, is not the U.S.A. one of the 
most modern of societies, certainly the most prosperous, and by its constitution, theoretically 
egalitarian and liberal? The reality of course is that the U.S. is not in every instance a melting 
pot that subsumes identities, but a nation that imposes an additional abstract loyalty to the flag 
and Constitution.  
Migrants from South Asia first began to arrive in the U.S.A. in considerable numbers in 
the 1960s following a liberalisation of immigration policies. Today there are more than a 
million, and since immigration policy has been biased towards the educated and qualified, 
they have been among the more successful of America’s citizens. Although the United States 
is officially a secular country, its interpretation of secularism, whilst separating State and 
religion, enjoins that equal respect be given to all religions (this is not far removed from the 
Indian idea of sarva dharma saramabhava).xi Both Muslims and Hindus in the U.S.A. are 
therefore given considerable freedom, even encouragement, in the exercise of their beliefs. 
Because of this, and because South Asians in the U.S. are very scattered, one might imagine 
that, in this land of immigration, the relatively prosperous communities of Indians, Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis might have found a way of living with each other, a modus vivendi, far 
removed from the conflicts and tensions of the subcontinent. This is, however, far from being 
the case. 
In her research, Aminah Mohammed has pointed out a wide range of prejudices and a 
labyrinthine growth of associations. There are conflicts particularly over the issue of 
language. Urdu and Hindi are used as markers of difference, particularly among Muslims (for 
whom it can be a symbol of their religious devotion), and many South Asians will insist on 
speaking to other South Asians in Urdu or Hindi, regardless of where they come from. Most 
Hindus are in fact from Gujarat or Punjab. A rift has thus developed between the Hindi/Urdu 
speaking North Indians and the South Indians, who never meet together in the same 
associations. Amongst north Indians, the Hindus and Muslims also meet in separate 
associations, whilst amongst Muslims, Hyderabadis and those from a Mohajir background are 
to be found, as in modern Pakistan, keeping apart from one another and meeting in separate 
elite organisations, Mohammed highlights particularly the role of community leaders, and 
holds them responsible for much of the animosity. Arguably though, these rifts might still fit 
within classical instrumentalist theories of communalism. To begin with, one could point out 
that prosperity is not the same thing as economic security. The U.S. is a highly mobile and 
competitive society where expectations are high. Economic opportunities fluctuate, albeit at a 
generally much higher level than in other societies, and these South Asian communities will 
inevitably at times find themselves as economic rivals. An interesting point about these 
divisions is that they are not primarily, it seems, religious. Any number of geographical or 
linguistic bases might be found for the creation of a new association, but Hinduism and Islam 
do not have a monolithic function, overdetermining this process. Thus Indians will even shun 
Hindus from the Caribbean, questioning their ‘Indianness’, whilst Hindus from African 
origins will be accepted as equals.  
Amidst the mêlée of competing associations amongst South Asians in the USA, the prospects 
for co-operation may seem limited, However there are optimists (Aminah Mohammed 
amongst them) who insist that some sort of South Asian pan-ethnicity will eventually emerge, 
comparable to that seen among Afro-Americans and Chinese Americans. Evidence for is to be 
seen already in annual events such as the Indian Day parades on August 15th, which are 
commonly attended by South Asians from every background. Through mobilisation and 
organisation the South Asian gay and lesbian movement in North America has also been 
particularly effective in overcoming received boundaries of all sorts (Roy 2008). The 
prospects for a South Asian pan-ethnicity seem to be strongest amongst the second and third 
generation offspring from migrant families, who culturally have more in common, not least of 
all the American language. Within the U.K., where South Asian communities have been 
established for rather longer, this development has already begun to take place. The principal 
obstacle is the lack of an appropriate vocabulary (the term ‘South Asian’ itself being 
unrecognised both by the migrant and host societies), but the English language (Dave 2005), 
film and popular music have all provided a means of communication that may reinforce but 
can also transcend communal boundaries. In particular one can point to the contributions of 
musicians such as the late Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, who achieved a following throughout South 
Asia and particularly among Asian communities abroad. The musical phenomenon of neo-
bhangra has also become a musical means of expressing South Asian identity, albeit in a 
male-dominated form, that is truly ‘post-colonial’, borrowing from every culture, and 
transcending ethno-religious boundaries.xii There is also of course the Bollywood movie 
industry, the stars of which enjoy a following in all parts of Asia and amongst every South 
Asian community abroad (Desai 2005, Kaur and Sinha 2005). Pakistani ‘sufi rock’ bands such 
as Junoon and pop classical bands such as Fuzon, have crossed the border in the opposite 
direction, winning a substantial following amongst Indian youth. Most recently the Coke 
Studio recordings, produced by Rohail Hyatt and broadcast on the internet as well as on 
Pakistani television, have combined international professional studio musicians with folk 
artists recruited from across the subcontinent, bringing together generations, nations, and 
diverse musical traditions. In such ways, as James Clifford (1997) and Homi Bhabha (1990) 
have argued, old and new diasporas can offer the resources for emergent postcolonial 
identities. 
 
 
Conclusion: A South Asian Pan-Identity 
One could conclude from a historical point-of-view that a South Asian pan-identity does not 
need to be discovered, so much as re-discovered. There are those who would maintain that 
such an identity was present in pre-modern times (Jalal & Bose 1998), and from the late 
nineteenth century there is evidence of high levels of mobility, and of the internationalisation 
of many South Asian migrants, from both working and middle class origins (Bates 1993, 
2000, Markovits 2000). Arguably, pre-modern society was always more fluid: it was the 
colonial period itself which saw a rigidification of custom and occupational specialisation, 
and of concomitant identities (Bates 1996, Washbrook 1996; Dirks 2001). Migration overseas 
was a means of escaping the increasingly inflexible and under-employed Indian labour 
market, and amongst those migrant workers, many had become highly cosmopolitan by the 
end of the colonial period, with Indians abroad commonly raising their status, economically 
and socially, and being 're-born' into a world free of caste, if not all forms of discrimination. 
In the process, new identities have been constructed to enable them to bridge the gap between 
the old and the new worlds and to maintain their links with both. Sadly, the legacy of conflict 
immediately before, during and after the de-colonisation process has commonly marred the 
relationship between South Asian communities, and between themselves and indigenous 
populations. The growth of postcolonial national identities has also commonly involved a 
process of definition by exclusion that has impacted negatively upon migrant groups—Sri 
Lanka and East Africa being here the most conspicuous examples. However, identities cannot 
exist in a vacuum as a product of will, nor are they solely created from elements drawn from 
identities of the past. The evolution of laws, constitutions and political assemblies, and the 
segregation of communities are a vital part in the history of identity formation. The imperial 
legacy in all these areas has often been profound, and imperial institutions enshrining caste, 
class, race and religion as the boundaries of South Asian communities have had important and 
long-term effects.  
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i	  	  The Vishwa Hindu Parishad is an international organisation and a key constituent of the so-called ‘Sangh 
Parivar’ or brotherhood of Hindu nationalist organisations in India. Founded in 1964 its aim is to protect and 
protect and promote Hindu society. It recent years it has campaigned controversially for the construction of a 
Hindu temple on the site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in north India and for the removal of Masjids from sites 
considered of importance to Hindus elsewhere in India. Jamaat-e-Islami is a religious and social party, the oldest 
in Pakistan, founded in 1941 in Lahore by the Muslim theologian Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi. A sister 
organisation was established in Bangladesh after 1971 and the Jamaat has close ties with international groups 
such as the Muslim brotherhood. Within Pakistan, the Jamaat leads the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance of 
religious parties. The Jamaat opposes westernisation and its objectives are the ‘Iqamat-e-Deen’ or ‘Nizam-e-
Mustafa’ - the establishment of a pure Islamic state, governed by Sharia law.	  
iiIt is noticeable that this practice of community-formation ‘from above’ is followed in the UK to this day: whilst 
police authorities in Britain are enjoined to consult with local ‘community leaders’ representative of Black, 
Asian, Muslim, Afro-Caribbean, and occasionally Gay and Lesbian ‘communities’, these leaders are not adopted 
through any constitutional or elective process but at the whim of officials. By contrast it is never felt necessary to 
single out and consult ‘white’ community leaders in this fashion since they form an almost absolute majority of 
elected members in local and national government. Not a single Muslim M.P., for example, had been elected to 
the U.K. Parliament until 1997 when Mohammed Salwar was elected to the constituency of Glasgow Govan— 
upon which he was immediately accused of electoral malpractice. 
iiiSee also Kelly, 1991 and 1992.  
iv	  On the fiftieth anniversary of the arrival of the first Indians, two different organisations called the Fiji Indian 
National Congress were formed in Fiji: one intending to celebrate the occasion, the other proposing that it should 
be marked by a day of mourning. The two Congresses agreed to amalgamate on 7 November 1929. The 
Congress aimed to unite and represent all Fijians of Indian origin. Unfortunately this goal was not achieved as 
disagreement over the distribution of relief funds following floods in 1930 caused the non-Hindu members to 
leave.	  
vThis discussion is partly based upon the author’s own first-hand observations in Mauritius in 1996-97 and again 
in 2004-05 for which acknowledgment is due to support from travel grants awarded by the University of 
Edinburgh’s Hayter Fund and the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland.  
 
vi	  	  In	  order	  to	  avert	  communal	  conflict,	  the	  1968	  constitution	  of	  Mauritius	  established	  what	  is	  know	  as	  the	  ‘best	  
loser’	  system.	  According	  to	  this	  system,	  62	  of	  the	  up	  to	  70	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Assembly	  are	  elected	  by	  
universal	  adult	  suffrage	  in	  a	  secret	  ballot	  from	  multi-­‐member	  constituencies	  by	  a	  plurality.	  The	  country	  is	  thus	  
divided	  into	  21	  Constituencies,	  each	  of	  which	  returns	  three	  members	  to	  the	  Assembly	  (except	  for	  the	  island	  of	  
Rodrigues	  which	  returns	  two).	  Each	  voter	  has	  three	  votes	  and	  all	  three	  votes	  must	  be	  marked	  on	  the	  ballot	  
sheet	  for	  the	  elector'	  choice	  to	  be	  valid.	  Up	  to	  8	  seats	  are	  then	  allocated	  by	  the	  Electoral	  Supervisory	  
Commission	  according	  to	  a	  complex	  formula	  to	  ‘best	  losers’	  to	  ensure	  ‘a	  fair	  and	  adequate	  representation	  of	  
each	  community’.	  
vii	  The	  Mahavamsa	  or	  The	  Great	  Chronicle	  of	  Ceylon,	  was	  translated	  into	  English	  by	  Wilhelm	  Geiger	  (Professor	  
of	  Indogermanic	  Philology	  at	  Erlangen	  University)	  under	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Ceylon	  and	  
published	  in	  London	  by	  the	  Pali	  Text	  Society	  in	  1912.	  
viii	  The	  Donoughmore	  Commission	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Donoughmore	  Constitution	  which	  
allowed	  Ceylon	  (now	  Sri	  Lanka)	  a	  substantial	  measure	  of	  self-­‐government	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1931	  and	  47.	  
The	  Donoughmore	  Constitution	  instituted	  a	  system	  of	  universal	  franchise,	  which	  enfranchised	  lower	  castes	  and	  
women	  over	  the	  age	  of	  21	  as	  well	  as	  adult	  males,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  by	  executive	  committees	  in	  
which	  every	  ethnic	  community	  was	  represented.	  These	  communities	  were	  conceived	  at	  the	  time	  as	  consisting	  
of	  Kandhyans,	  Sinhalese,	  Ceylon	  Tamils,	  Indian	  (Plantation)	  Tamils,	  and	  Europeans.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ix	  The	  Mohajir	  Qaumi	  Movement	  (MQM)	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  Muttahida	  (‘United’)	  Quami	  Movement	  in	  1997	  
in	  an	  effort	  to	  broaden	  its	  constituency	  and	  has	  indeed	  acquired	  a	  following	  in	  the	  northern	  areas	  of	  Pakistan.	  
Since	  its	  foundation	  in	  1978	  it	  has	  remained,	  nonetheless,	  predominantly	  an	  organisation	  representing	  the	  
interests	  of	  Mohajirs	  from	  its	  powerbase	  in	  Sindh,	  where	  it	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  party	  after	  the	  PPP	  (Pakistan	  
People’s	  Party)	  and	  the	  third	  largest	  in	  Pakistan.	  Despite	  its	  progressive	  stance	  on	  many	  issues	  the	  MGM	  was	  
accused	  of	  involvement	  in	  violent	  militant	  activities	  and	  was	  amongst	  the	  targets	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  army’s	  clean	  
up	  campaign	  from	  1992-­‐1999.	  Since	  1992	  the	  MQM’s	  founder,	  Altaf	  Hussain,	  has	  lived	  in	  exile	  in	  London.	  	  
x	  	  The	  Pakistan	  People’s	  Party	  was	  founded	  in	  1967	  by	  Zulfikar	  Ali	  Bhutto	  and	  in	  2010	  is	  Pakistan’s	  largest	  
political	  party.	  Following	  the	  assassination	  of	  Z.A.	  Bhutto’s	  daughter	  Benazir	  Bhutto	  in	  2007,	  her	  nineteen-­‐year	  
old	  son,	  Bilawal	  Bhutto	  Zardari	  and	  his	  father	  Asif	  Ali	  Zardari	  (currently	  President)	  were	  appointed	  co-­‐chairmen	  
of	  the	  party.	  It	  is	  a	  centre	  left	  party	  whose	  strongest	  support	  comes	  from	  landholding	  families	  and	  electorate	  of	  
the	  southern	  province	  of	  Sindh,	  although	  it	  also	  has	  a	  following	  within	  the	  urban	  areas	  of	  Punjab,	  Baluchistan	  
and	  the	  	  Khyber	  Pakhtoonkhwa	  (formerly	  NWFP).	  	  
xi	  	  The	  Hindu	  concept	  of	  Sarva	  Dharma	  Sambhava	  is	  not	  equivalent	  to	  secularism.	  It	  literally	  means	  that	  all	  
Dharmas	  (truths)	  are	  equal	  to	  or	  harmonious	  with	  each	  other.	  As	  such,	  it	  supporters,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Indian	  constitution,	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  religion	  might	  have	  a	  role	  in	  public	  life	  but	  merely	  insist	  that	  one	  religion	  
should	  not	  take	  precedence	  over	  another.	  
xii	  	  Neo-­‐bhangra	  is	  traditional	  Punjabi	  bhangra	  dance	  music	  mixed	  with	  reggae	  or	  rap.	  Originating	  within	  the	  
(notably	  UK)	  diaspora,	  it	  has	  a	  strong	  youth	  following.	  continues	  to	  adapt	  and	  change,	  and	  is	  now	  popular	  
across	  several	  generations.	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